Skip to main content

Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

See other formats

defend its cause and the possibility of presenting its rights to the world
was limited^ although the voices of its enemy could resound unchecked
in every sphere of propaganda.
In 19395 the Polish cause had stood out clearly before the eyes of Great
Britain and the world, and in voluntarily giving her pledge tc Poland,
the former had made no mention of a e Curzon Line ' or^ for that matter,
any other demarcation line. Britain had given her pledge to a Poland in
her entirety 3 as she had then existed within her frontiers. Apart from
Berlin., no hesitation whatsoever upon this point had been expressed. Ii
is not difficult to collect a large volume of speeches^ articles,, promises of
every kind which were made by British Premiers and American leaders^
ministers, diplomats and journalists on the matter. And yet, after a
few years under constant barrage of Russian propaganda^ a section of the
Anglo-Saxon public had either changed,, or else,, no longer seemed sure
that its opinion was the right one. Only the influence of the Soviet's
propaganda could have induced part of the Press in the countries of United
Nations to voluntarily serve as the supporters of Moscow claims, and direct
the bitterest of attacks against one of its allies. There was probably no
paper, not even a Communist one (at least until September 17, 1939} in
Britain and U.S., which had not been unanimous in condemning the
invasion of Poland, yet in the beginning of 1943, there were many who
commenced to express the opinion that to halve Poland for the benefit of
Russia ought to be done, for the simple reason that she was stronger of the
two, while Poland's resistance to this decimation was classified by the
same people as a " suicidal lack of commonsense," and the Polish Govern-
ment, " this London Government" was judged as " behaving with a
folly which its Allies cannot defend."5* It would be out of proportion to
state that this and similar utterances were the genuine expression cf the
united British opinion, but nevertheless, the British public was being fed
with propaganda of this type.f At the end of November, 1943, despite
energetic protests from the public, almost the entire English Press began
to employ the expression, e the old Polish frontier,^ when referring to
* The New Statesman and Nation, February 19th, 1944.
t Editor, The Nineteenth Century and After > January, 1944:
There is, in the British Press, an almost complete uniformity, from The Times to
the Daily Herald, in the treatment of the Yugoslav situation—even the Daily
Worker does not differ widely from The Times. This is but one of the many
symptoms of the Gleichshaltung of the British press in the treatment of Foreign
Affairs. Direct and truthful reporting^ incisive analysis^ and critical judgment
have been replaced by an officially directed tendenciousness and by a moralising
attitude that has small relevance to the realities. The British public was rarely
so IB-informed with regard to Foreign Affairs as it is during the present wsr . .
£ The T*me$ on January 12th, 1943, published a letter from L. D. Gamrnan,
Why does the B.B,C.S in its bulletins on the fighting in Russia always refer to the
crossing of the " 1939 " Polish frontier ? Surely that line still remains the frontier
of Poland. It was to defend it, and the other frontiers of Poland, that Great
Britain pledged her word and ultimately went to war.
„ . „ The phraseology used by the B.B.C. suggests that the question is already